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In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) released Macy v. Holder,' a courageous decision placing
the Commission at the center of an evolving and politically
rancorous debate over the definition of "sex" in American law. In
Macy, the EEOC joined a growing number of U.S. appellate courts
in holding that Title VII is "trans-inclusive," i.e., that Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination covers discrimination based on
transgender status and gender identity.' Still, politicians, some
judges, and many legal commentators continue to treat a trans-
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1. See No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
2. The term "sex" used here refers to chromosomal or genital differences, while
"gender" refers to the cultural or social constructions and expectations that
accompany chromosomal differences. Traditional notions of sex, including those
that were pervasive at the time the Civil Rights Act was signed into law, did not
distinguish between sex and gender, resulting in a social expectation that assumed
all males were masculine, while all females were feminine. This conflation was
used to justify gender roles and prevent women from gaining status in society. See
Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 161, 164-65
(1996). "Gender nonconformity" refers to any variation between these two
variables, such as feminine males and masculine females. Id. at 194.
3. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011); Kastl v.
Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. App'x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009); Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 757 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214
(1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000).
"Transgender" is an "umbrella" term that refers to "all identities or practices that
cross over, cut across, move between, or otherwise queer socially constructed
sex/gender boundaries." Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the
Village of Chamounix Performing Transgender Rage, 1 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY
STuD. 237, 251 n.2 (1994). Not all transgender individuals are "transsexuals," who
"seek surgical alteration of their bodies." Id.
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inclusive Title VII as a revolutionary idea." The EEOC's Macy
decision demonstrates how this treatment has become outdated,
and the legal community must now accept a new trans-inclusive
Title VII paradigm. Inclusion is no longer an academic fantasy, it
is the exclusive conclusion reached by the U.S. appellate courts
that have squarely addressed the issue in the past twenty years, it
is the position of the EEOC, and it is a logical and necessary
extension of sex discrimination jurisprudence.
This paradigm shift can wait no longer. Transgender
Americans face deeply entrenched hostility, often leading to
ostracism, discrimination, and even violence.' Even more
troubling, the courts, institutions on which Americans rely to
dispense justice, have historically treated transgender individuals
unfairly, if not with outright derision. Resistance in the legal
community permits these unnecessary injustices to occur. Even
more frustrating, it adds unnecessary complications to legislative
4. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty I), No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005
WL 1505610, at *7 (D. Utah June 24, 2005) (rejecting vehemently the idea that
Title VII protected transgender individuals from workplace discrimination);
Brittany Ems, Preparing the Workplace for Transition: A Solution to Employment
Discrimination Based on Gender Identity, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1329, 1330 (2010)
(lamenting the lack of federal and state protection for transgender employees and
noting the circuit split on the issue); Jackie Kucinich, GOP Support for Gay Rights
Measure Slips, ROLL CALL (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/55_121/-
45524-1.html (reporting that Republicans would not support a trans-inclusive
ENDA).
5. See, e.g., Dan Frosch, Death of a Transgender Woman is Called a Hate
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at A13; Evelyn Nieves, After Sex Change, Teacher
is Barred From School, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 27, 1999, at A12; Chastity Pratt, The
Perilous Times of Transgender Youth, N.Y. TiMES, Jun. 18, 1995, at CY7.
6. See Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., Civ. Action No. 78-4037, 1979 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("I find it somewhat difficult to accept
the proposition that the constitutional right of privacy . .. attaches also to a
person's decision to surgically rearrange the parts of his body . . .. It might just as
easily be argued that the right of privacy protects a person's decision to be
surgically transformed into a donkey."); Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are
Transgender People Strangers to the Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150,
154 (2005) ("No matter how a transgender plaintiff articulates his injury, he is
likely to encounter a court that draws a line in a way that makes him a stranger to
all of the laws that could protect him."). Compare Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59
(Nev. 1986) (terminating Daly's rights as a father on the grounds that he was no
longer a man), with In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 10 (Stark Cnty. Prob. Ct.
1987) (denying Ladrach a marriage license because he was still not a woman),
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 2004) (voiding the
marriage of Michael Kantaras because he was legally a woman), In re Estate of
Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002) (voiding J'Noel Gardiner's marriage
because she was legally a man), and Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex.




efforts to pass protective legislation. If Title VII protected
transgender individuals from discrimination, the need for such
politically unpalatable protection to be added to legislation such as
the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) would be
reduced. This in turn would give progressive politicians cover to
pass protections for other vulnerable populations such as gays and
lesbians. With ENDA essentially dead in Congress, transgender
individuals still without non-discrimination coverage in twenty-
one states," and momentum finally building in the judiciary, the
need for a paradigm shift could not be more urgent and the time
for a bold new vision is now.
The goal of this Note is to challenge conventional
assumptions as to the accepted scope of Title VII by arguing that
modern courts are no longer split, but have come to a consensus.
This Note further argues that, in order to adequately address
difficult and looming issues in the area of employment
discrimination, the legal community should adopt a new paradigm
in which Title VII is trans-inclusive. This paradigm shift from
circuit split to consensus is justified by the fact that every federal
appellate court to rule on this issue in the past decade, along with
the EEOC and a sizable cadre of district courts, has adopted a
7. The Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) is legislation that has
been proposed regularly over the last twenty years that would prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation and, since 2007, discrimination based on
gender identity. See H.R. Res. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011); S. Res. 811, 112th Cong.
(2011). The addition of gender identity in 2007 caused a schism between the
pragmatic factions of the Democratic Party that recognized only protection for
sexual orientation could pass the House and the absolutist factions of the Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community that demanded an all-or-
nothing package. Shailagh Murray, Quandary Over Gay Rights Bill: Is It Better to
Protect Some or None?, WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 2007, at A23. Although the House
eventually passed a version of ENDA, the legislation self-destructed in the Senate
when activists objected to the absence of explicit protection for gender identity.
8. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have passed trans-inclusive
anti-discrimination legislation including California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See Transgender Issues:
A Fact Sheet, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST.,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (last updated Feb.
2012) [hereinafter Transgender Issues]. Another thirteen states are covered by
trans-inclusive Title VII decisions out of the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Tennessee. The remaining
twenty-one states have no protection, at neither the state nor federal level, for
transgender employees, though individual counties and municipalities may have
their own protective ordinances. See Transgender Issues, supra.
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trans-inclusive definition of Title VII. Although some early cases
held that "transexualism" was not covered under Title VII,"
subsequent Supreme Court precedent has eviscerated their central
rationales." These rare non-inclusive cases should not be treated
as an alternative model to the modern consensus that Title VII is
trans-inclusive.
Part I of this Note follows the history of sex discrimination
laws from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the rapid
expansion of the 1970s, to the retrenchment of the 1980s, and the
eventual revival of the 1990s. The purpose of this historical
review is to place the entire Note in the broader historical context,
which allows a more complete discussion of the issues,
controversies, and developments that have lead to the modern
consensus that transgender discrimination implicates Title VII.
Part II argues that the trans-inclusive model of Title VII has a
strong analytical foundation supported by the development of sex
discrimination jurisprudence, while the non-inclusive cases are
hopelessly flawed or have been implicitly overturned. As a result,
the only cases that offer any value to the law are those reaching a
trans-inclusive result. Part III offers two legal and policy areas,
sexual orientation under Title VII and ENDA, that would benefit
from the clarity afforded by adopting of a trans-inclusive paradigm
in Title VII law.
9. See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1321; Kast1 v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325
Fed. App'x 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2009); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,
738-30 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith, 378 F.3d at 578; Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215; Schwenk,
204 F.3d at 1201; see also Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C.
2006); Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C. Apr.
20, 2012). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty II), 502 F.3d 1215, 1227-28
(10th Cir. 2007) (suggesting in dicta that transgender plaintiffs would not be
covered by Title VII).
10. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. (Ulane II), 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984);
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 ("The initial judicial approach taken in cases
such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of [Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins]."). A few district courts have adhered to early transgender
cases in spite of more recent Supreme Court pronouncements, but because the
district court opinions fail to address contrary Supreme Court precedent, these
early district court decisions offer little in the way of compelling arguments or
persuasive reasoning. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty I), No.
2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3 (D. Utah June 24, 2005) (relying heavily on
Ulane Il); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 3109541, at
*4-*5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (relying heavily on Ulane II).
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I. Title VII & Sex Discrimination: a History
The development of sex discrimination law has expanded and
contracted in a series of waves. Starting with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act, the movement for equal employment rights for
women has faced significant obstacles. Initially, corporate and
business interests convinced regulators to abandon enforcement of
the Act's "sex provision."1 The New Feminists fought back,
securing robust enforcement, only to have their efforts halted by a
newly conservative Supreme Court. 3 In the thirty years since, the
Court's narrow interpretation has been relaxed, but obstacles still
remain for many vulnerable groups."
A. The First Wave: the Revolutionary Civil Rights Act &
the Reactionary EEOC
Congress took up the first Civil Rights Act in the spring of
1964." As expected, the debates centered on issues of race,
national origin, and ethnicity. However, on February 8, 1964,
Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia, usually an ardent
opponent of women's rights, proposed that the term "sex" be added
to the list of protected classes." This surprising announcement set
off a heated debate over gender roles in the workplace. Supporters
decried oppressive gender stereotypes that kept women out of
12. Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination,
125 HARv. L. REV. 1307, 1323-24 (2012).
13. Id. at 1342, 1353.
14. Id. at 1356-57.
15. One year earlier President Kennedy had called for the elimination of race
discrimination in a letter to Congress. See 109 CONG. REC. 11,174 (1963). In his
letter, the President called for, among other things, a law that would require fair
employment practices and prohibit race discrimination in private employment. Id.
at 11,178.
16. For a more thorough analysis of the Congressional debate on Title VII, see
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966).
17. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). Some members of
Congress feared the amendment was a poison pill designed to undermine the entire
Act. See id. at 2581 (statement of Rep. Green) ("I honestly cannot support the
amendment ... and I hope that no other amendment will be added to this bill on
sex or age or anything else, that would jeopardize our primary purpose."). The idea
that the amendment was intended to sabotage the entire Act has become widely
accepted in legal scholarship; however, there is evidence to suggest that
conservative supporters may have feared that without the addition of "sex,"
minority women would get preference over white women. See id. at 2583
(statement of Rep. Andrews) ("Unless this amendment is adopted, the [W]hite
women of this country would be drastically discriminated against in favor of a
Negro woman.").
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well-paying positions" and the "arrogant prejudice" of protective
legislation." Opponents countered with fears that women in the
workplace might upset "traditional family relationships."20 In the
end the amendment passed 168 to 133,21 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, including the prohibition on sex discrimination in
employment, became law on July 2, 1964.22
Unfortunately, the agency tasked with enforcing this
revolutionary new law, the EEOC," was unprepared to deal with
24the sex discrimination provision. Opponents of women's rights
quickly took advantage of the Agency's confusion by again
invoking gender roles and stereotypes to argue for limited
enforcement. At the 1965 White House Conference on Equal
Employment Opportunity, participants worried that opening
managerial jobs to women would make those women unavailable
to care for their husbands and children.25 Even the Executive
18. Id. at 2580 (statement of Rep. St. George).
19. Id. at 2580 (statement of Rep. Griffiths). Not all women's rights groups
were opposed to protective legislation. The President's Commission on the Status
of Women (PCSW) was the most outspoken opponent of the addition. The PCSW,
then chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, supported expanding rights for women, but still
believed that the central role of women was in the home. Thus, the PCSW strongly
supported protective legislation. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 139-54 (1988). The PCSW opposed
the Smith Amendment, and Representative James Roosevelt, Eleanor's son, took
his mother's message to the floor of the House. See 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
20. Id. at 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler).
21. Id. at 2584.
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 101, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Title
VII states, "[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at 255.
23. The EEOC was founded in 1961 by President Kennedy to "scrutinize and
study employment practices of the government and recommend additional
affirmative steps . . . to realize more fully the national policy of nondiscrimination."
See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 86, 87 (1961).
24. Because Congress had stripped much of the EEOC's authority to prosecute
and try cases, the new Agency suffered from a lack of political power and influence.
See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER
IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1960-1972, at 103-04 (abr. ed. 1992). In addition, many of
the Agency's personnel had joined to battle race discrimination, and were
unprepared for the influx of so many sex discrimination claims. See Franklin,
supra note 12, at 1334-35. Finally, many political figures and media outlets
treated the "sex" provision as a joke, with some even calling for it to be repealed.
Id. at 1333. Together these factors contributed to the Agency's inability and
unwillingness to effectively respond to sex discrimination claims brought under
Title VII.
25. Id. at 1336.
THE TRANS-INCLUSIVE PARADIGM
Director of the EEOC was not without bias as evidenced by his
statement, "no man should be required to have a male secretary,"
alluding to the common practice of treating secretaries as work
wives.26 Richard Berg, the EEOC's Deputy General Counsel,
responded to these fears by promising that the EEOC would
interpret Title VII taking into account "national mores," a less
than subtle euphemism for popular gender stereotypes.27 Only the
Commission's lone female member, Aileen Hernandez, objected,
but there was little she could do against this tide of opposition.
"The message came through clearly," she stated, "that the
Commission's priority was race discrimination ... and apparently
only as it related to Black men.""
In this climate, the reactionary EEOC released its first
interpretations of Title VII, which were overwhelmingly favorable
to employers.29 The Commission declined to take a strong stance
on sex-segregated advertisements.o The Commission also declined
to challenge state protective legislation." However, a second wave
of expansion was beginning to form as prominent women joined
Hernandez's call for a renewed push for women's rights in
employment.32 A blistering indictment of the EEOC on the House
floor," a groundbreaking law review article," and the founding of a
new women's rights organization35 all lead to the rise of the New
Feminists, who confronted the EEOC and eventually took control
of the national debate on sex discrimination.36
26. Id. at 1337 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1340.
28. GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 107.
29. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 1333-34.
30. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 31 Fed. Reg. 6414, 6414
(Apr. 28, 1966) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
31. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,927,
14,927 (Dec. 2, 1965) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604) ("The Commission does not
believe that Congress intended to disturb such laws and regulations which are
intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women against exploitation and
hazard.").
32. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 1334.
33. See id. at 1343.
34. See id. at 1342-44.
35. See id. at 1342.
36. See id. at 1345. See also GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 111. The New
Feminists, feminists concerned with social and employment equality, are better
known today as "Second Wave" feminists, compared to the earlier generation of
feminists, "First Wave" feminists, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, who were concerned
primarily with suffrage and political consciousness. For a more thorough
discussion of the relationship between these two feminist groups, see generally
LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL
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B. The Second Wave: the New Feminists Take on
Washington & the Supreme Court
1. The Rise of the New Feminists & the Anti-Sex-
Stereotyping Philosophy
On June 20, 1966, Michigan Representative Martha Griffiths
took to the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives and blasted
the EEOC's "wholly negative attitude toward the sex provision of
Title VII," accusing the EEOC of "fostering public ridicule [of Title
VII] which undermines the effectiveness of the law."" Other
feminist leaders also began to challenge popular gender
stereotypes. Professor Pauli Murray co-authored Jane Crow and
the Law, a groundbreaking article attacking the myth that sex
discrimination was less pervasive and less severe than race
discrimination, which was often used by the EEOC to justify
ignoring the "sex" provision." Betty Friedan published The
Feminine Mystique, attacking the gendered stereotypes of happy
housewives and the male "breadwinner."" Together with Aileen
Hernandez, these visionary women formed the National
Organization for Woman (NOW), whose founding mission would be
to fight for equal employment opportunity and an end to sex
stereotyping in the workplace.4 o
NOW immediately set to work reversing the EEOC's
decisions. In 1966, the EEOC had concluded that the practice of
separating job postings into separate columns based on sex did not
violate Title VII." NOW demanded that the EEOC and the New
CULTURE (1995); JANE GERHARD, DESIRING REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAvE FEMINISM
AND THE REWRITING OF AMERICAN SEXUAL THOUGHT (2001).
37. 112 CONG. REC. 13,689 (1966) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
38. Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. L. REV. 232 (1965). For a more thorough
discussion of race-gender analogies in the women's rights movement, see generally
Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination:" Race-Gender Analogies in
Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001).
39. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (N.Y. Dell ed. 1970).
40. At the time, a number of other women's rights organizations, such as the
PCSW, existed; however, these groups grew out of the first feminist movement that
sought women's suffrage and were pushing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
These groups were hesitant to support equal employment opportunities for women,
and their refusal to support robust enforcement was a significant factor in the
creation of NOW, which would eventually displace these older organizations and
dominate the debate. See Nicholas Pedriana, Help Wanted NOW: Legal Resources,
the Women's Movement, and the Battle Over Sex-Segregated Job Advertisements, 51
Soc. PROB. 182, 192-93 (2004).
41. So long as the job was actually open to both sexes, the EEOC saw no
problem with the publisher indicating which sex would find the job most attractive.
176 [Vol. 32:169
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York Times end the practice, and when these efforts failed, NOW
took to the streets in protest.42  In 1968, the EEOC bent to the
pressure and reversed their position." NOW then moved quickly
to build on their victory by attacking the EEOC's 1965 guidance
shielding protective legislation under the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) exception." In 1969, the EEOC again
reversed itself in the face of pressure from NOW, holding instead
that protective laws "will not be considered a defense to an
otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis
for the application of the [BFOQ] exception."' By the early 1970s,
NOW's influence had spread to Congress, which was pushing
through unprecedented pro-women's rights legislation including
an expansion of the Civil Rights Act, laws supporting children of
working mothers, and the Equal Rights Amendment." Even
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 31 Fed. Reg. 6414, 6414 (Apr. 28,
1966) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
42. In August of 1967, the New York chapter of NOW aggressively picketed the
New York Times in an effort to force them to change their practices. In December,
NOW held demonstrations against the EEOC in five major cities. Finally, in 1968,
NOW filed a writ of mandamus to force the EEOC to "carry out their lawful duty."
See Pedriana, supra note 40, at 194 (citing AILEEN C. HERNANDEZ & LETITIA P.
SOMMERS, THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, 1966-1971, at 26-27 (1971)); see also John H.
Florer, NOW: The Formative Years: The National Effort to Acquire Federal Action
on Equal Employment Rights for Women in the 1960s, 64-70 (Dec. 18, 1972)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS
OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 77 (1975).
43. In a short press release the EEOC stated, "the placement of job
advertisements under separate male and female column headings violates the law."
Pedriana, supra note 40, at 194 (citing Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Issues
Guidelines on Classified Advertising, Rules Separate Male-Female Ads Illegal
(Aug. 6, 1968). The updated EEOC guidelines did not come out immediately
following the announcement because a group of newspapers sued to enjoin the
EEOC's publication. See Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F.
Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968). However, their efforts eventually failed, and by the
early 1970s most newspapers had desegregated their job advertisements.
Pedriana, supra note 40, at 194 n.6.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2010). Rather than taking on these protective
statutes directly, the EEOC left it to Congress and the states to root out any
"archaic" legislation that no longer served its original purpose. Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14926 (Dec. 2, 1965) (codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1604).
45. See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1188 (1971).
46. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (1972).
47. The Comprehensive Child Development Act offered federal support for child
care and was designed to combat the stereotype that women were needed at home
to care for children. S. 1512, 92d Cong. (1971). The Act was eventually vetoed by
President Nixon and never went into effect.
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members of the Supreme Court seemed to favor NOW's anti-sex-
stereotyping view, denouncing "ancient canards about the proper
role of women.""
In this favorable climate, the EEOC, under the influence of
NOW, embarked on a new campaign against the airline industry.
For the airlines, young, attractive, unmarried stewardesses were
an essential part of the in-flight experience for their
predominantly male clientele."0 For NOW, these policies were the
worst examples of sex stereotyping in action. The airlines initially
argued that the policies fell within Title VII's BFOQ exception on
account of their male clientele and their then-famous advertising
campaigns." The EEOC disagreed, 2 and it quickly became clear
that the BFOQ defense was a losing argument." The airlines then
began to challenge whether policies involving both sex and another
characteristic, such as marital status or age, could even be
considered sex discrimination at all, relying on the recent Supreme
Court decision of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.' In that
decision the Supreme Court held, "[t]he existence of such
conflicting family obligations ... could arguably be a basis for
distinction under [the BFOQ exception]."" These claims became
known as "sex plus" claims, and the airlines found some success in
48. See 118 CONG. REC. 9597 (1972). For a full listing of the acts passed during
this era, see Franklin, supra note 12, at 1345-46 n.204.
49. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
50. Franklin, supra note 12, at 1348.
51. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (Diaz I), 311 F. Supp. 559,
561-64 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (analyzing the history of the use of flight attendants and
concluding that the female-only policy was a BFOQ); Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc. (Sprogis 1), 308 F. Supp. 959, 962 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (rejecting United's claim that
unmarried-only policy was a BFOQ).
52. The airline industry successfully sought to have the EEOC's decisions
enjoined because of Hernandez's support of NOW. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v.
Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227, 232 (1967).
53. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (Diaz II), 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir. 1971) (finding that female-only policy was not a BFOQ); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc. (Sprogis ll), 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that
unmarried-only policy was not a BFOQ).
54. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 544-45. Justice Marshall's concurrence demonstrates that the
Phillips opinion was a departure from Congress's intent to target sex stereotypes.
He stated, "I fear that in this case, where the issue is not squarely before us, the
Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards
about the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress, however,
sought just the opposite result." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
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arguing that they were not sex discrimination.56 Suddenly, the
anti-sex-stereotyping philosophy of the New Feminists had a
competitor, which would become known as the anti-classification
philosophy."
2. Pregnancy Discrimination & the Victory of the
Anti-Classification Model
Following the airline cases, pregnancy discrimination became
the next Title VII battleground. In 1972, the EEOC issued
guidelines concluding that pregnancy-related discrimination was
sex discrimination and prohibited by Title VII," and by 1975, five
federal circuits agreed." Dissenting in an earlier insurance case,
Justice Brennan succinctly pointed out that pregnancy was a
disability "suffered only by women" and thus singling out
pregnancy amounted to sex discrimination.60 In holding pregnancy
discrimination unlawful, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the
anti-classification model stating, "[tihe effect of the statute is not
to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a
portion of [women]." Thus, by 1975, the conventional wisdom
held that Title VII applied with equal force to "sex plus" claims.
56. See, e.g., Lansdale v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 68-1458-CIV-CA, 1969 WL
139 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 1969) (holding that the airline's policy of only hiring
unmarried female stewardesses did not violate Title VII because marital status was
not protected); see also Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D.
La. 1967) ("[I]t is plain that Congress did not bann [sic] discrimination in
employment due to one's marital status and that is the issue in this case.").
57. The anti-classification model of sex discrimination holds that Title VII and
other nondiscrimination statutes only prohibit discrimination "against women
because they are women and against men because they are men." See Ulane v. E.
Airlines, Inc. (Ulane II), 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). Under this extremely
narrow interpretation, any policies that place women and men into separate classes
violate Title VII. However, where either of the two classes would include both men
and women, such as "sex plus" policies distinguishing between pregnant persons
(which would only include women) and non-pregnant persons (which would include
both men and women), there would be no violation. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert (Gilbert 11), 429 U.S. 125, 125 (1976) (holding that "disparity in treatment
between pregnancy-related and other disabilities was not sex discrimination").
58. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (Apr.
5, 1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
59. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. Gen.
Elec. Co. (Gilbert 1), 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961
(9th Cir. 1975).
60. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Hutchison, 519 F.2d at 965 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.
(Sprogis II), 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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In 1976, this conventional wisdom came to an abrupt end in
General Electric Company v. Gilbert (Gilbert II).62 In Gilbert II,
employees of General Electric were guaranteed up to twenty-six
weeks of leave under the company insurance plan." However,
pregnancy was not considered a "disability" under the plan and
when Gilbert, and other coworkers, requested leave for their
pregnancy, they were denied." Gilbert sued and was successful in
both of the lower courts.65 Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist adopted the narrow anti-classification model, holding
that Title VII is violated only when the effect of a classification is
to "discriminat[e] against the members of one sex or the other."'
Turning to the case at hand, he found it indisputable that "[t]he
fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program ... accrue to members
of both sexes."67 Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist concluded, "[als
there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men
than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based
discriminatory effect."' In Gilbert II, the Supreme Court not only
adopted the relatively new anti-classification approach, but also
argued 'that they were bound by a long history of judicial
construction to adhere to it.6' Whether inadvertently or
purposefully, the Court ignored a decade-long public discourse in
which both sides assumed that the Civil Rights Act was about
gender roles, and then summarily reversed a decade-long
progression in which the public and policy-makers determined
that reliance on these gender roles in the workplace was unlawful.
Gilbert II did not go unnoticed, and members of Congress
quickly took to the floor to denounce the Court."' Congressman
Paul Tsongas responded by admonishing Gilbert II as "a function
of sex bias in the law."" He called for the passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) as a means of putting an end
to a system that "forces women to choose between family and
62. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
63. Id. at 128.
64. Id. at 129.
65. See Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gilbert I), 519 F.2d 661, 663 (4th Cir. 1975).
66. Gilbert II, 429 U.S. at 136-37.
67. Id. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974)).
68. Gilbert II, 429 U.S. at 138.
69. Professor Cary Franklin takes the Gilbert II Court to task, arguing that
they "invented" this "long tradition" to support their narrow view of the sex
discrimination provision. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 1363-66.
70. See 124 CONG. REC. 21,434 (1978).
71. Id. at 21,442 (statement of Rep. Tsongas).
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career."72  The PDA passed both houses of Congress with
overwhelming majorities,7 and it was clear that Congress had
reversed not only the holding in Gilbert II, but also the reasoning
applied by the Court." Unfortunately, despite Congress's explicit
rebuke, Gilbert 11 continues to exert often-controlling influence on
sex discrimination law.
3. The Courts Reject "Transsexualism" as a
Protected Class Under Title VII
The first transgender discrimination cases arose just as the
anti-classification model was taking hold in the federal judiciary."
The courts of the era relied primarily on two justifications in
holding, without exception, that transgender discrimination was
not sex discrimination: (1) that Congress's silence on the matter
was proof of Congressional intent to exclude transgender
plaintiffs; and (2) that sex discrimination was limited to
classifications bisecting all men and all women.77  The Ninth
Circuit was the first to tackle this issue, just one year after the
Supreme Court's sweeping decree in Gilbert II. In Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson, the plaintiff was terminated from her job shortly
after informing her supervisor of her intent to transition from
male to female." The Ninth Circuit found that the "clear intent" of
72. Id. The House Committee on Education and Labor struck a similar chord,
stating that women being forced to leave the labor market when they became
pregnant was at the "root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-
paying and dead-end jobs." H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 149 (1978).
73. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of seventy-five to eleven. 123 CONG.
REC. 29,664 (1977). The bill passed the House by a vote of 376 to 43. 124 CONG.
REc. 21,450 (1978).
74. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
678 (1983) ("When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously
expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the
Gilbert [II] decision."). Although the legacy of Gilbert II remains a persistent
controversy, it is clear that the Court has fully embraced the prohibition on
pregnancy discrimination. In fact, the Court has gone so far as to permit
preference in favor of pregnancy, which is a complete reversal of their prior
position. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
75. See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.2d 884, 889-90 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (relying exclusively on Gilbert II and concluding that a ban on breastfeeding
was not sex discrimination).
76. See, e.g., Elec. Co. v. Gilbert (Gilbert 1l), 429 U.S. 125 (1976). While not the
first transgender discrimination case decided by the Court, Gilbert II was among
the earliest of these cases, and it remains the quintessential anti-classification case
in this field.
77. See Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 659 (9th Cir. 1977);
Ulane v. E. Airline, Inc. (Ulane II), 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984).
78. 566 F.2d at 661.
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Title VII was to remedy the "economic deprivation of women as a
class" and that "Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex'
in mind."" Accordingly, the court declined to extend protection to
"transsexuals."o8
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit further explained Holloway's
"traditional notion of sex" in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines." Kenneth
Ulane, a decorated veteran, began flying for Eastern Airlines in
1968.82 In 1980, Ulane underwent surgery to become a woman,
after which her employment with the airline was terminated."
The district court found that Ulane could state a claim for sex
discrimination.' Judge Grady wrote, "sex is not a cut-and-dried
matter of chromosomes," but involves society's perception of the
individual.5 The Seventh Circuit rejected Judge Grady's nuanced
opinion and reversed, holding that "sex" should be given its
"ordinary, common meaning," implying that Title VII is limited to
discrimination "against women because they are women and
against men because they are men."' The court found support for
this conclusion in the "dearth of legislative history" and the fact
that Congress had attempted and failed to amend Title VII to
include "affectional or sexual orientation."" Accordingly, the court
79. Id. at 662.
80. Id. at 664. Judge Goodwin objected to the panel's treatment of
"transsexuals" as though they were genderless. Goodwin stated:
Had the employer waited and discharged the plaintiff as a postsurgical
female because she had changed her sex, I suggest that the discharge
would have to be classified as one based upon sex. I fail to see any valid
Title VII purpose to be served by holding that a discharge while an
employee is in surgery, or a few days before surgery, is not as much a
discharge by reason of sex.
Id. (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
81. Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1086.
82. Id. at 1082.
83. Id. at 1083-84.
84. Id. at 1084.
85. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. (Ulane 1), 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Judge Grady's prophetic decision has enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent
years. Both commentators and judges have looked to that decision, rather than the
majority of decisions in this and other early transgender cases, as instructive on
the proper interpretation of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424
F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill.
1983) ("[I]t may be time to revisit Judge Grady's conclusion in Ulane I that
discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is 'literally'
discrimination 'because of.. . sex.'").




found that Ulane was terminated not because of her sex but
because she was a "transsexual."'
Before the 1990s, not a single court found transgender
plaintiffs protected under Title VII or similar state laws."
However, the anti-classification model suffered significant erosion
following Gilbert II." Over time the court opened other avenues
for victims of workplace discrimination. In the third wave of
expansion, plaintiffs found the courts more willing to adopt the
anti-sex-stereotyping philosophy and recognize that "sex" and
"gender" are broad terms that apply to a wide range of
discrimination." With the resurgence of the anti-sex-stereotyping
philosophy, Title VII protection was finally extended to
transgender plaintiffs at the turn of the century.92
88. Id. at 1087.
89. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that Title VII's ban on sex discrimination does not encompass
discrimination based on "transsexualism"); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davis Med. Ctr., 403
F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that employment discrimination based
on "transsexualism" is not covered under Civil Rights Act protection); Sommers v.
Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (holding that
employment discrimination on basis of "transsexualism" is not banned under the
Iowa Civil Rights Act); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977)
(holding that Title VII does not touch discrimination against "transsexuals");
Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1196, 1199
(D.N.J. 1975) (dismissing school teacher's sex discrimination claim on the grounds
that termination from her teaching position on account of her gender reassignment
surgery was not based on sex); Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177-78
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding discrimination originating from gender reassignment
surgery does not constitute sex discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act); Terry v. EEOC, 35 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1395, 1397 (E.D. Wisc.
1980) (concluding that Title VII and the U.S. Constitution do not protect males who
dress or act as females and vice versa).
90. See 124 CONG. REC. 21,434, 21,439-42 (1978) (statement of Rep. Tsongas);
124 CONG. REC. 21,450, 21,452 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 29,664, 29,662-64 (1977);
see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983) (disapproving of the Gilbert II Court's narrow interpretation of the term
"sex" in Title VII).
91. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (finding a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim is a class of sexual discrimination covered
under Title VII); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding
that the EEOC "should be granted access to information concerning the petitioners'
patient applications" and remanding for further proceedings); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990-01 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding quid pro quo discrimination prohibited
under Title VII).
92. The first case in which a circuit court recognized transgender




C. The Third Wave: the Anti-Sex-Stereotyping Philosophy
Re-Emerges to Protect Women Who Swear & Men Who
Wear Makeup
Following Gilbert II, the anti-classification model of
discrimination exerted a strong influence on Title VII law.
Although it still serves as a baseline for anti-discrimination cases,
the court has slowly expanded the scope of discrimination beyond
purely biological classifications.93 In the decade following the
passage of the PDA, the anti-sex-stereotyping model of
discrimination re-emerged as the Court found objectionable two
forms of sexual harassment and the use of sex-stereotyping. These
developments gave rise to some level of protections for gender non-
conforming persons.
1. Applying the Anti-Sex-Stereotyping Philosophy to
Protect Gender Non-Conforming Women in the
Workplace
Over the course of a decade following Gilbert II, the Court
recognized two forms of harassment: quid pro quo harassment,'
where some job-related status is conditioned on acceptance of a
sexual advance, and "hostile environment" harassment," where an
employer creates a work environment so "heavily charged" with
sex discrimination "as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers."96 Quid pro quo
discrimination flows naturally from the anti-classification
doctrine. In Barnes v. Costle, an Environmental Protection Agency
employee was terminated when she refused her supervisor's
sexual advances." The court initially seemed to apply the anti-
classification model, stating, "her job was conditioned upon
submission to sexual relations[,] an exaction which the supervisor
would not have sought from any male."" However, the court then
departed from this narrow view by observing, "the statutory
embargo on sex discrimination in employment is not confined to
differentials founded wholly upon an employee's gender. On the
93. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994; Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
94. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994.
95. See Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66; see also Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding "that a hostile or offensive atmosphere
created by sexual harassment can, standing alone, constitute a violation of Title
VII").
96. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
97. 561 F.2d at 989.
98. Id. at 989.
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contrary, it is enough that gender is a factor contributing to the
discrimination in a substantial way."" This broader language
would open the door to "hostile work environment" claims a few
years later."
Unlike quid pro quo discrimination, it is more difficult to
justify "hostile work environment" claims by arguing that they fall
along strict gender lines. In fact, sexually hostile environments
often target both men and women who fail to conform to the
"masculine" culture of the work place.10 The same anti-feminine
barbs, such as "bitch," are used to attack nonconformity regardless
of the person's sex.10' Thus, these claims would likely be defeated
under the anti-classification model because both men and women
are subjected to the anti-feminine environment and harassment.
The court got around this problem by employing a race-gender
analogy, a clear departure from the strict standard in Gilbert II.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Mechelle Vinson, a bank teller,
was physically fondled at work and agreed to have sexual
intercourse with her supervisor for fear that she might lose her job
99. Id. at 990.
100. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 57 (extending the "hostile work
environment" logic used in racial discrimination cases to gender discrimination
cases); Henson, 682 F.2d at 897 (finding that sexual harassment creates a "hostile
work environment" which violates Title VII).
101. Professor Ann C. McGinley observes that the culture of the workplace is one
dominated by "masculinity." Employers rely on "masculine" supervisory practices
such as authoritarianism, paternalism, entrepreneurialism, informalism, and
careerism that heavily favor employees who exhibit masculine characteristics,
while disfavoring women, effeminate men, and sexual minorities. At the same
time, employees compete with one another to prove their "masculinity" through the
feminization of their supervisors and coworkers. These practices at all levels of the
business structure create an environment that is inherently hostile to women,
effeminate men, and sexual minorities. See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries:
Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 713, 721-26 (2009).
102. Men and women are both harassed in the work place through the same use
of vulgar language and sexualization. When applied to women it is easily
recognizable as pejoratives such as "bitch," but the same language is often used to
harass men as well, suggesting that all sexual harassment is primarily an attack
on real or perceived feminine characteristics. Compare Hocevar v. Purdue Fredrick
Co., 223 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[He constantly referred to women as
'bitches,' 'fucking bitches,' and 'fat fucking bitches.'"), and Reeves v. C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Calling a female colleague a
'bitch' is firmly rooted in gender. It is humiliating and degrading based on sex."),
with James v. Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App'x 864, 865 (10th Cir. 2004)
("Groth's conduct included ... calling [James] his 'bitch,' and making obscene and
vulgar statement[s] with sexual connotations.").
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if she refused.' The court analogized "hostile environment"
claims under race discrimination, which were already widely
accepted.'" The court reasoned, "[slexual harassment which
creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex
is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality."'o This
language re-opened the door to the anti-sex-stereotyping principles
that existed before Gilbert II.
The Court finally embraced the anti-sex-stereotyping
philosophy in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, when the Court
recognized a cause of action for discrimination based on "sex
stereotypes."o' Price Waterhouse involved a female associate at a
large accounting firm who was denied a partnership because of her
sex.o' By all accounts, Hopkins was one of the best associates at
the firm, however, when it came time to be evaluated for partner,
a number of partners commented that she needed a "course at
charm school" and that she was "a lady using foul language."on
When it came time to inform her of why she was denied a
partnership, she was told she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
103. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60. The district court concluded that there
was no sexual harassment, and thus no sex discrimination. Vinson v. Taylor
(Vinson I), No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980). On appeal the
D.C. Circuit ordered a remand so the district court could review previously
disregarded evidence. Vinson v. Taylor (Vinson II), 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
104. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); Firefighters Inst. for
Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977).
105. See Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21-22 (1993) (reaffirming and clarifying the "hostile environment" standard).
106. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). Judge Posner
questions whether Price Waterhouse actually created a separate cause of action or
whether the Court intended for sex-stereotypes to serve merely as evidence of sex
discrimination. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-67
(7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). Most of the courts reviewing transgender
discrimination, however, have treated sex-stereotyping as a separate cause of
action. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that discrimination based on gender non-conformity constitutes sex-based
discrimination); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App'x 492, 493
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that "it is unlawful to discriminate against a transgender
(or any other) person because he or she does not behave in accordance with an
employer's expectations for men or women.").
107. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
108. Id. at 235.
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hair styled, and wear jewelry."'" After quoting Title VII the Court
concluded, "we take these words to mean that gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions."o The Court continued,
"when, therefore, an employer considers both gender and
legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision
was 'because of sex . . . ."' In so doing, the Court set aside the
anti-classification model and adopted a broad view that outlawed
all uses of sex-stereotyping, even when it does not categorize
people into male and female groups. Relying on this new
understanding, the Court found, "in the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on
the basis of gender."" The Court continued, "we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they match the stereotype associated with their
group.""' Price Waterhouse may represent a philosophical return
to the anti-sex-stereotyping rationale of the New Feminists."4 At
the very least, however, it is a significant departure from the anti-
classification model.
2. Applying the Anti-Sex-Stereotyping Philosophy to
Protect Gender Non-Conforming Men in the
Workplace
In the ten years immediately following Price Waterhouse, a
second wave of transgender discrimination cases came before the
109. Id. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found
other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Price Waterhouse's partnership
decision, but concluded that it still constituted sex discrimination unless Price
Waterhouse could show through clear and convincing evidence that they would
have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory reasons.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse (Hopkins 1), 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1121 (D.D.C. 1985).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding of liability, but reversed
its decision as to proper relief and remanded. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse
(Hopkins ll), 825 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
110. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
111. Id. at 241.
112. Id. at 250.
113. Id. at 251.
114. The lower courts have applied Price Waterhouse in a number of recent
decisions targeting policies that unfairly prohibit mothers from finding work. See
Chadwich v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44-48 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that a
woman who was denied a promotion because she had three children could make a
sex-stereotyping claim under Title VII); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that "stereotyping of women




courts. Some courts initially ignored the new precedent and
continued to mechanically apply Holloway and Ulane II.11' Other
courts acknowledged Price Waterhouse, but expressed reservations
about departing from what was at that point an unbroken chain of
cases holding against transgender plaintiffs."' However, a few
brave state courts began to interpret state nondiscrimination laws,
often analogous to Title VII, more expansively in order to protect
transgender plaintiffs."'
The first major shift in federal court interpretation of sex
discrimination came in Schwenk v. Hartford, where the Ninth
Circuit held that a transgender plaintiff could state a claim for sex
discrimination under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
(GMVA)."' Crystal Schwenk, a transgender woman, was sexually
harassed and assaulted while incarcerated at an all-male state
penitentiary in Washington state." Judge Reinhart, writing for
the panel, began by recognizing that Holloway was no longer good
law: "[tihe initial judicial approach taken in cases such as
Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse."120 Freed from the constraints of Holloway, the court
applied Price Waterhouse's sex-stereotyping rationale:
"[h]ere... the perpetrator's actions stem from the fact that he
115. See, e.g., Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that an employee is not protected under Title VII for
discrimination on the basis of her "transsexualism"); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act does not protect an employee discharged on the basis of one's
"transsexuality"); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 478, 480-82
(D. Kan. 1995 ) (finding a plaintiff "cannot state a claim for discrimination based
upon "transsexualism" because employment discrimination based upon
"transsexualism" is not prohibited by Title VII").
116. See, e.g., Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 98-4254CVCSOWECF, 2000
WL 1585257, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000) (finding that "it is unclear, however,
whether a trannsexual is protected from sex discrimination and sexual harassment
under Title VII").
117. See, e.g., Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995) (finding "transsexuals are protected against discrimination under the
provisions of the [New York City] Administrative Code"); Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys.,
No. 95 Civ. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (citing
Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, supra) (finding that New York Human Rights Law and
New York City Law protected "transsexuals" from discrimination); Enriquez v. W.
Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (concluding
that "sex discrimination under the [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination]
includes gender discrimination so as to protect plaintiff from gender stereotyping
and discrimination for transforming herself from a man to a woman").
118. 204 F.3d 1187, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 1193-94.
120. Id. at 1201.
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believed that the victim was a man who 'failed to act like' one."
The sex-stereotyping rationale has served as the basis for
expanding the definition of "sex discrimination" to transgender
plaintiffs under other statutes and constitutional provisions as
well.'22
In 2004, the Sixth Circuit extended this logic to Title VII and
became the first federal appellate court to hold that transgender
plaintiffs are protected under Title VII: in Smith v. City of Salem,
Smith, a lieutenant in the Fire Department, drew the ire of her co-
workers when she first began dressing as a woman at the direction
of her doctor. 2 3 When she complained to her supervisors, she was
121. Id. at 1202. The court supported its conclusion with the undisputed
evidence that the harassment began only after Mitchell became aware that
Schwenk identified as a female, and that Mitchell sought to bolster that
identification by bringing Schwenk "girl stuff." Id. Thus, the Court reasoned that
Mitchell's actions were motivated, at least in part, by Schwenk's "assumption of a
feminine rather than typically masculine appearance or demeanor." Id.
122. See Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000)
(applying Price Waterhouse to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and finding
transgender plaintiffs protected); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.
2011) ("All persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination
on the basis of gender stereotype . . .. The nature of the discrimination is the
same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and discrimination on this basis is a
form of sex-based discrimination that is subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. . . ."). Glenn is a particularly interesting case, since the
court called for heightened scrutiny. Id. at 1319. For a more thorough examination
of the use of heightened scrutiny in Glenn v. Brumby, see Gwen Havlik, Equal
Protection for Transgender Employees? Analyzing the Court's Call for More Than
Rational Basis in the Glenn v. Brumby Decision, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1315 (2012).
123. Id. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). Smith was
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), a requirement before a
transgender person can get access to gender reassignment surgery. See Arlene
Istar Lev, Disordering Gender Identity: Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-IV-
TR, 17 J. PSYCHOL. & HUMAN SEXUALITY 53-54 (2005) (referring to GID as an
"admissions ticket" to receiving medical treatment). Four of the largest insurance
companies also have strict policies requiring a GID diagnosis before they will cover
the extremely expensive gender reassignment surgery, making it nearly impossible




y.pdf (last updated Dec. 15, 2006); Clinical Policy
Bulletin: Gender Reassignment Surgery, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical
/data/600_699/0615.html (last updated Oct. 15, 2013); Clinical UM Guideline:
Gender Reassignment Surgery,
ANTHEM, http://www.anthem.com/medicalpolicies/guidelines/gl-pw a051166.htm
(last updated June 8, 2012); Gender Identity






forced to undergo three humiliating psychological examinations in
the hopes that she would resign."4 Instead, she filed a claim with
the EEOC."' The Sixth Circuit chastised the district court for
relying on pre-Price Waterhouse cases stating, "the approach in
Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane [II ... has been eviscerated by
Price Waterhouse."1 2 6 The court then analogized the discrimination
against Ann Hopkins, asserting:
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates
against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses
or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex. It
follows that employers who discriminate against men because
they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because
the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex.127
Therefore, the court concluded that discrimination against
transgender persons was indistinguishable from the
discrimination against Ann Hopkins."' Both the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits have reaffirmed their positions in subsequent decisions,"'
and a number of district courts have also recognized Price
Waterhouse as creating a viable path for transgender plaintiffs."'
tyDisorderCD.pdf (last updated Apr. 1, 2013). A few courts have come close to
suggesting that a GID diagnosis might also be necessary to prove transgender
status for Title VII purposes. However, this view has been criticized, and no court
has explicitly required a GID diagnosis in order to prove transgender status. See,
e.g., Jackie Barber, Glenn v. Brumby: Extending Protection from Sex-Based
Discrimination to Transsexuals in the Eleventh Circuit, 21 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY
169,176-77 (2012).
124. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69.
125. Id. at 569.
126. Id. at 573.
127. Id. at 574.
128. Id. at 575 (holding that "discrimination against a plaintiff who is a
transsexual-and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender-is no
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price
Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman").
129. See Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App'x 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding that "transgender individuals may state viable sex
discrimination claims on the theory that the perpetrator was motivated by the
victim's real or perceived non-conformance to socially-constructed gender norms");
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that "a
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, however, can properly lie where the
claim is based on 'sexual stereotypes'"). But see James G. O'Keefe, Pyrrhic Victory:
Smith v. City of Salem and the Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
1101, 1111-27 (2007) (criticizing Smith and predicting that more similar decisions
would cause Congress to amend Title VII to explicitly exclude "transsexuals").
130. See Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL
34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW,
2005 WL 1502899, at *4 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005); Mitchell v. Axcan
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3. Coming Full Circle: Gender-Nonconformity as
Sex Discrimination Per Se
Sex-stereotyping may not be the only path for transgender
plaintiffs. In Schroer v. Billington, the District Court for the
District of Columbia suggested that transgender discrimination
might be sex discrimination per se."' Diane Schroer applied for
and was hired as a Terrorism Research Analyst while still
presenting as a man.' When she informed her supervisor of her
intention to transition, her offer was promptly rescinded.' Judge
Robertson rejected the application of Price Waterhouse in Smith,
arguing, "[protection against sex stereotyping is different, not in
degree, but in kind, from protecting men, whether effeminate or
not, who seek to present themselves as women, or women, whether
masculine or not, who present themselves as men."' According to
the court, Schroer was seeking recognition not as a feminine man,
but as a traditional woman.' Thus, since her goal was not to
transgress stereotypes, but to adopt an entirely new gender and
conform to its stereotypes, Price Waterhouse did not apply.'36
However, the court held that this same logic suggests that Schroer
should have a claim for sex discrimination per se, since her offer
was rescinded solely because of her gender identity, which the
court defined as the "real variations" in how biological sex and
social concepts of gender, both protected by Title VII already,
interact together."' This, the court reasoned, was per se
discrimination because of sex."
Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
17, 2006).
131. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006).
132. Id. at 206. There was no question that Schroer was the most qualified
applicant for the position. As a twenty-five-year veteran, she spent her last seven
years in Special Operations Command coordinating special operations in the War
on Terror. After her military service, she became an analyst for a consulting firm
working with the National Guard on infrastructure security. Id. at 205-06.
133. Id. at 206.
134. Id. at 210.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 213. The court also makes the case for strong protection of intersex
individuals, arguing that "[d]iscrimination against such women (defined in terms of
their sexual identity) because they have testes and XY chromosomes, or against
any other person because of an intersexed condition, cannot be anything other than
'literall]' discrimination 'because of... sex.'" Id. at 213 n.5 (citing Ulane I, 581 F.
Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1984)); see also Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex:
Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination "Because
of... [Perceived] Sex," 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55, 118 (2010) (arguing
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The per se discrimination argument received a boost in 2012,
when the EEOC released a unanimous decision by the
commissioners that transgender discrimination was per se sex
discrimination. In Macy v. Holder, Mia Macy's offer for
employment with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) was rescinded when she informed her employer
that she was transgender.'" Macy filed a complaint, but the ATF
split the claims into two separate claims, one for sex and another
for transgender status.o Under agency policy the sex
discrimination claim would be adjudicated by the EEOC, and the
transgender claim would be adjudicated by the ATF."' Macy
appealed the claim identification to the Agency itself for
resolution, arguing that the transgender claim should be classified
as a sex discrimination claim. 4' The Agency accepted the appeal
and unanimously reversed the ATF's classification.'" The Agency
rejected the idea that "sex stereotyping" was a distinct cause of
action, rather an employer's reliance on stereotypes was simply
evidence that "the employer actually relied on gender ... in
making its decision."'" Since any reliance on gender was
prohibited by Title VII, the Agency had little trouble finding the
decision to change one's gender protected.'' The Agency
analogized gender "conversion" to religious conversion: "[ilmagine
that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to
Judaism .... Discrimination 'because of religion' easily
that intersex individuals should be protected, and that Title VII should be
reinterpreted as prohibiting discrimination "because of perceived sex.").
138. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13. The "per se approach" received mixed
reviews from commentators. Compare Illona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se:
Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (asserting
that it is "morally and logically necessary for the courts to . .. [conclude] that
transgender discrimination is per se sex discrimination."), with Katrina McCann,
Transsexuals and Title VII: Proposing an Interpretation of Schroer v. Billington, 25
WIs. J. L. GENDER & Soc'Y 163, 179-80 (2010) (arguing that the per se approach in
Schroer was ambiguous and that sex stereotyping should remain a viable
alternative to prove sex discrimination).
139. Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *2-*3 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 12,
2012).
140. Id.
141. Id. The ATF's policy offers far fewer rights and remedies than the EEOC,
and the ATF's decisions cannot be appealed to the EEOC. Id. This makes a
hearing before the EEOC's administrative law judges preferable to adjudication
within the ATF. Id.
142. Id. at *3.
143. Id. at *4.
144. Id. at *7 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).




encompasses discrimination because of a change in religion.
The Agency found no reason to distinguish between the two
situations and found that transgender discrimination constituted
discrimination "because of sex."4 1
A few courts have continued to adhere to Ulane II, despite
the expansion of the law. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, a
federal district court in Louisiana found Price Waterhouse
distinguishable because the transgender plaintiff was not
exhibiting stereotypical behavior, but rather was "pretend[ing] to
be a woman."4  In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority (Etsitty I), a
federal district court in Utah similarly held that "[tihere is a huge
difference between a woman who does not behave as femininely as
her employer thinks she should, and a man who is attempting to
change his sex and appearance to be a woman."'49 Perhaps most
startling is Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, where a federal
district court in Indiana concluded that Ulane II was still good law
and thus prohibited the transgender plaintiffs claim, because
other courts have refused to apply Price Waterhouse. '
4. The Courts Continue to Police the Boundaries of
Gendered Bathrooms
Although Price Waterhouse has expanded the definition of sex
discrimination, transgender plaintiffs must still contend with the
"legitimate business reasons" prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test.' One area where businesses have found success using this
defense is gendered bathrooms. This was the issue in the Tenth
Circuit case Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority (Etsitty II)."'
Krystal Etsitty, a bus operator for the Utah Transit Authority
(UTA), was terminated shortly after she began presenting as a
146. Id. at 8 (citing Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008).
147. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
148. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *5
(E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
149. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty I), No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL
1505610, at *5 (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
150. No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003).
151. Sex discrimination claims fall under the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting analysis. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Under this approach, a court first looks to whether the employee has made a prima
facie case of discrimination. See id. at 802-05. When the plaintiff successfully
makes such a showing, the employer may still show that it had a "legitimate
business reason" for taking the action. See id. If the employer satisfies this second
prong, it is fatal to a discrimination claim unless the plaintiff can show that the
proffered reason is a pretext for an unlawfully discriminatory decision. See id.
152. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
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woman, because the UTA feared that they might be held liable for
her use of public restrooms."' The district court found that she
could not state a claim for sex discrimination."' However, the
Tenth Circuit ultimately determined that it "need not decide" that
issue."' Instead, the court assumed that Etsitty had stated a
claim and turned to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test."6 On this prong, the court concluded that "an employer's
requirement that employees use restrooms matching their
biological sex does not expose biological males to disadvantageous
terms and does not discriminate against employees who fail to
conform to gender stereotypes.""' Thus, the court found the UTA's
proffered business reason-that the agency feared lawsuits from
passengers-was not pretext for discrimination on the basis of
sex.1"' Thus far, no court has ruled otherwise."'
III. The Transgender Consensus: Why a Trans-Inclusive
Paradigm Is the Only Interpretation that Makes Sense
The conventional wisdom for many years has been that there
is a deep circuit split on the question of whether transgender
plaintiffs are entitled to protection under Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibition. 6 o On one side are the cases of
Schwenk, Smith, and Schroer, and on the other are Ulane II and
153. Id. at 1219.
154. Id. at 1218.
155. Id. at 1220-24.
156. Id. at 1224.
157. Id. at 1225.
158. Id.
159. See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000-02 (N.D. Ohio
2003) (holding that an employer's rule that a pre-operative transgender woman
may only use the men's restroom did not violate the ADA and was not sex
stereotyping discrimination under Title VII); see also Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights
Act to mean that allowing of a transgender woman to use the women's restroom
does not constitute sexual harassment toward other female employees).
160. See, e.g., Marvin Dunson III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Present
and Future of Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
465, 481 (2001) ("This is too rosy a picture, of course, for if Manhart and Sprogis II
can be overlooked, so too can Schwenk."); Ems, supra note 4, at 1330 ("[Mlore than
thirty states currently lack antidiscrimination legislation for transgenders in the
employment arena . . . . [T]he federal government provides little more protection
. . . . [Clircuits are split as to whether Title VII protects transgender plaintiffs.");
Shannon H. Tan, When Steve is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why Courts and
Legislators Need to Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37




Etsitty II. Five years ago caution may have been appropriate, but
today transgender individuals are protected from discrimination in
twenty-nine states, representing nearly two hundred million
Americans,16' the EEOC 62 and the federal courts are generally
friendly to transgender claims,'63 and the anti-classification model,
which for so long was used to deny transgender plaintiffs their day
in court, has fallen out of favor.'" In this positive climate, there is
reason to challenge the conventional wisdom. In fact, adopting a
new trans-inclusive paradigm is the only reasonable way to
account for these advancements in Title VII jurisprudence. The
following section argues that the trans-inclusive cases are the
logical extension of sex discrimination jurisprudence, while the
non-inclusive cases, Ulane II and Etsitty II, cannot be squared
with the development of the law. If there is a disagreement among
the circuit courts today, it is not between the trans-inclusive and
non-inclusive cases, but rather within the trans-inclusive
paradigm-whether transgender discrimination should be
challenged as sex discrimination per se or sex-stereotyping. 16
161. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, these twenty-nine states contain approximately two hundred million
residents. See U.S. Census Bureau, USA Quick Facts, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Sep. 27, 2012).
162. It is worth noting also that the EEOC's Macy decision, though not binding
on the federal courts, is controlling within the Agency's own adjudicatory
apparatus, which covers all of the nearly three million employees of the federal
government. See Rasmussen v. Potter, No. 01A51123, 2005 WL 936731, at *2
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 12, 2005).
163. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that
transgender individuals are covered by the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition
on sex discrimination, and applying heightened scrutiny); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty.
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. App'x 492, 494 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that
discrimination against transgender employees could constitute sex stereotyping in
violation of Title VII, but concluding that safety concerns justify enforcement of
gender-exclusive bathrooms); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th
Cir. 2005) (finding that discrimination against transgender individuals can
constitute impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (establishing that discrimination against
transgender individuals can constitute impermissible sex stereotyping under Title
VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that discrimination against transgender individuals can constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (establishing that the
protections of the Gender Motivated Violence Act extend to transgender
individuals).
164. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 574 (holding that discrimination against
individuals failing to conform to gender stereotypes is sex discrimination).
165. There may also be a third option, referred to as a "constructionist approach"
and discussed in Ulane I by Judge Grady, that the sexual binary itself is socially
"constructed." This approach might playfully be referred to as Price Waterhouse
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A. The Trans-Inclusive Consensus Is the Logical Extension
of Sex Discrimination Jurisprudence
The First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
transgender discrimination is sex discrimination.166  They were
joined in 2012 by a unanimous determination by the EEOC.'67
There are two reasons why these cases should be given controlling
weight. First, Price Waterhouse is clearly controlling over
transgender cases and commands a trans-inclusive result. Second,
the court has a long history of adhering to the reasoned view of the
EEOC on matters relating to sex discrimination.'" These reasons,
expounded upon below, counsel in favor of a trans-inclusive result
and should be given substantial respect and persuasive authority.
No matter how one tries to categorize transgender
discrimination, Price Waterhouse is controlling precedent. There
are only two reasons why an employer might discriminate against
transgender individuals: because they dress or act in a manner
associated with the opposite gender, or because they wish to be a
member of the opposite gender. The former situation, where an
employer discriminates because of dress or behavior, is precisely
the issue addressed in Price Waterhouse. In Price Waterhouse the
Court condemned the employer for requiring that women conform
to certain feminine stereotypes, such as wearing make up and
being soft-spoken. 6 9 As the court in Smith recognized, if it is
unlawful to require women to conform to sex stereotypes, it must
be equally unlawful when applied to men."' Therefore,
terminating a male employee for wearing a dress or being
effeminate runs directly counter to Price Waterhouse.
The second situation, where an employer bases its decision on
transgender identity alone, is slightly more complicated, but still
"on steroids," since it appears to suggest that all differences in sex or gender are
necessarily socially constructed "stereotypes." Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. (Ulane I)
591 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983). This approach has only been seriously
debated in feminist scholarship, and has yet to be taken up by the courts. See
Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 455-60
(2012). The argument has merit, but without discussion by the courts it falls
outside the scope of this Note.
166. See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1317; Smith, 378 F.3d at 574; Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215-
16; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
167. See Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
168. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 1314.
169. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
170. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
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controlled by the logic of Price Waterhouse. Where the employer
relies instead on the desire to "be" or "transition" to another
gender, common sense suggests that the result should still be the
same. An employer cannot terminate an employee for wanting to
change her sex, without first taking the employee's current or
future sex into account. Such a decision would clearly be
prohibited by Price Waterhouse, which held that "gender must be
irrelevant.""' Even if we make the far-fetched assumption that it
is the transition, and not the emplyoee's current or future sex
being targeted, the District Court for the District of Columbia
correctly analogized religious conversion in Schroer."' An
employer who terminates an employee for wishing to change her
religion has clearly made a decision based on religion. The same
would be true for an employee who wishes to change her sex."'
The trans-inclusive decisions therefore rest on a solid
foundation of legal analysis and scholarship. They should,
however, hold additional persuasive authority because they are
supported by the EEOC, which the courts have long looked to for
reasoned analysis in sex discrimination cases."' The Supreme
Court has adopted the EEOC's view in almost every sex
discrimination case to come before the Court.'75 Most notably, the
Court adopted the EEOC's position on sexual harassment in
171. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
172. Schroer v. Billington, 557 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2006)
("[Discrimination 'because of religion' easily encompasses discrimination because
of a change of religion.").
173. Even assuming that the "transition" had nothing to do with sex, identities
like "tranagender" or "transsexual" identify an individual with a class defined by
nonconformity to sex stereotypes, and as such are so "loaded" with gender
stereotypes as to be indistinguishable from them. Thus, Price Waterhouse's
prohibition on sex stereotypes could be triggered even when the employer makes a
decision based solely on "transgender" status. See Sunish Gulati, The Use of
Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2177, 2195-96 (2003).
174. It is true that the federal courts are not bound by an EEOC decision in the
same way that they would be bound by a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert (Gilbert II), 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
However, the EEOC decisions, like any agency pronouncements, "do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
175. It is true, however, that the Court has been far less accepting of EEOC
pronouncements in other areas of employment discrimination. See Sutton v.
United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 194 (2002). It is noteworthy, however, that these cases were also
overturned by Congress. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122




Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.' 6 The Court again adopted the
EEOC position when it held that Title VII applied equally to men
in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.'77 Only
once has the Court declined to follow the EEOC's lead. In Gilbert
II, the Supreme Court dismissed the EEOC's interpretation,
stating, "the 1972 guideline flatly contradicts the position which
the [A]gency had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to the
enactment of the governing statute."'7 ' The result of the Court's
failure to respect the EEOC's interpretation was a Congressional
rebuke."' Given this long history of deference and the EEOC's
extensive experience in sex discrimination, it would be wise to give
the commissioners' unanimous decision in Macy substantial
consideration.
B. Old & Out of Context: the Absurdity ofApplying Ulane
II and Etsitty II
Ulane II and Etsitty II are often seen as counterweights to
Smith, Schwenk, and Schroer; however, Ulane II and Etsitty II
should not be included in the same class as the latter cases. Ulane
II is now outdated, and, although it has yet to be explicitly
overruled, its rationale has been all but eviscerated by
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence. Etsitty II, on the
other hand, is a recent decision; however, it does not address the
same issue that trans-inclusive cases do, namely the definition of
sex discrimination. Instead, Etsitty II addresses the separate
issue of whether, notwithstanding the scope of the definition of
sex, a business can have legitimate reasons for limiting bathroom
access based on gender. This is a legally distinct problem that
should not be conflated with the scope of sex discrimination
addressed in Smith, Schwenk, and Schroer.
Ulane II should be retired, but not simply because it is a case
from another era. More importantly, the theoretical
176. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
177. 462 U.S. 667, 676 (1983).
178. Gilbert II, 429 U.S. at 142
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(e) (2010) (amending Title VII to prohibit
pregnancy-based employment discrimination). The Justices themselves have also
been critical when their colleagues have failed to give "respectful consideration" to
the EEOC's guidance. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 626 (2009) (Ginsberg,
J., dissenting) ("Recognizing EEOC's 'enforcement responsibility' under Title VII,
we have previously accorded the Commission's position respectful




underpinnings of the case have collapsed. In Ulane II, the
Seventh Circuit relied on two arguments to justify its decision:
legislative silence and the strict anti-classification model."'o These
justifications are no longer valid. First, the court's use of
legislative intent was misplaced, since it took Congressional
inaction on legislation protecting sexual orientation as dispositive
evidence of Congress's view toward "transsexuals."'" This
argument is seriously flawed because there is a clear, well-
recognized difference between homosexuality, the subject of the
legislation in question, and gender identity, which was not
included in national legislation until 2007.182 However, even if we
assume this is the correct interpretation, legislative silence has
always been a dubious method of statutory interpretation.'" Even
the use of legislative intent itself has come under attack. Justice
Scalia's textualist approach in Oncale demonstrates the downfall
of legislative intent in sex discrimination analysis: "statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed."'" It is hard to imagine two "evils" more intimately
related than the rigid sex stereotypes applied to women and those
applied to "transsexuals." As such, the textual analysis favored by
the Supreme Court's most conservative members may actually
favor transgender plaintiffs. ' 5
Second, Ulane II rests heavily on the anti-classification view
that sex discrimination is limited to discrimination against "men
because they are men" or "women because they are women."" As
Justice Holmes wrote, "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.""' The historical perspective offered in Part II of this Note
180. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. (Ulane II), 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984).
181. Id.; see also Richard F. Sorrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism," 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 272, 313-14 (1997)
("[B]y equating transexualism with sexual orientation, the courts, in jurisdictions
whose anti-discrimination laws do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation ... ultimately deny them, along with gays and lesbians, legal
protection from employment discrimination.").
182. See Valdes, supra note 2, at 161-64.
183. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D. D.C. 2006).
184. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Srvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
185. For a more thorough discussion of textualism's potential value to
transgender plaintiffs, see Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism,
and the Supreme Court: What Is the "Plain Meaning" of "Sex" in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 573, 638-49 (2009).
186. Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1085.
187. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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demonstrates that Title VII was never intended to be limited by
anti-classification principles, but was designed to strike at the
"spectrum" of arbitrary gender roles and their corresponding social
and economic limitation.'" Legal scholars and judges should not
limit their analysis to the debates of 1964, but should also look to
the circumstances of 1972, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was expanded and the anti-sex-stereotyping view had come
to dominate the political scene.19' It can hardly be argued that a
Congress concerned with childcare, an issue consistently treated
as a "sex plus" claim in court, had only the extremely narrow anti-
classification view of discrimination in mind at the time. Even if
the original intent of Title VII had been narrow, the subsequent
amendments were clearly designed to expand it. The Supreme
Court mistakenly held otherwise in Gilbert II and was rebuked by
Congress as a result.' Further evidence that the anti-
classification view should no longer sustain Ulane II is that sex
discrimination law has grown substantially. Cases on which
Ulane II relies heavily, such as Holloway, have since been
overturned."' In retiring Holloway, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Price Waterhouse had "eviscerated" the decision."' The demise of
Holloway should be seen as a serious blow to Ulane II, and Ulane
II should also be retired in recognition of the fact that its core
principles and rationale have long been abandoned. 93
Etsitty II is the only contemporary circuit court decision to
question whether transgender discrimination implicates "sex."
Although the district court decision, Etsitty I, does find that
188. See discussion in Part II, supra; see also City of L.A., Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (citing Sprogis II, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971) ("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.").
189. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (1972); GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 200-03.
190. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert (Gilbert ll), 429 U.S. 125, 135; Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983); 124 CONG.
REC. 21434, 21442 (1978) (statement of Rep. Tsongas); H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3
(1978); supra note 74 and accompanying text.
191. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The initial
judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic
and language of Price Waterhouse."); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989).
192. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004).
193. See Dunson, supra note 160, at 474 ("This entire line of cases and its odd
reasoning stands in stark contrast to the other Title VII cases that involve the
interpretation of 'sex' outside the transgender context. These cases concluded that
employment decisions based on stereotyped characteristics of men and women are
unlawful under Title VII.").
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transgender discrimination is not sex discrimination, the Tenth
Circuit in Etsitty II sidestepped that issue,"" instead resolving the
case on the less controversial issue of gendered bathrooms."' It is
somewhat disingenuous, therefore, to suggest that Etsitty II offers
an alternative view to Schwenk, Smith, and Schoer. It does not.
Although the Tenth Circuit does question these cases in dicta, the
court comes to no firm holding on the definition issue.' Etsitty II
is, therefore, part of a separate line of cases. Access to gendered
bathrooms will certainly be an issue of incredible importance in
the future and is one that deserves thorough review;97 however,
these decisions have rested largely on the "legitimate business
reason" prong of the sex discrimination analysis, not the definition
prong (the definition prong being the focus of this Note).'
Accordingly, Ulane II and Etsitty II offer nothing to counter the
well-reasoned analysis of Schwenk, Smith, and Schoer. As such,
Ulane II and Etsitty II should not be viewed as part of a circuit
split with the trans-inclusive cases. Instead, Ulane II should be
retired, and Etsitty II should delineate a separate line of cases,
leaving only the trans-inclusive ones as the consensus.
IV. The Road Ahead: How a Trans-Inclusive Paradigm
Offer Solutions to Difficult Title VII Problems
The failure to adopt a trans-inclusive paradigm until now has
had real consequences. The perception that there is a circuit split
has permitted reactionary lower courts to further victimize
transgender plaintiffs, forestalled reexamination of workplace
discrimination against gay and lesbian plaintiffs, and added
needless urgency to calls for a legislative solution. A new
194. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth. (Etsitty 17), 502 F.3d 1215, 1220-24 (10th
Cir. 2007).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 1221-22.
197. For a discussion of this issue, see Diana Elkind, The Constitutional
Implications of Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: an Examination of
Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 896-97 (2007) (urging courts to recognize denial of
bathroom access as discrimination against transgender individuals and legislatures
to adopt protective laws).
198. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). This case
uses racial discrimination (rather than sex discrimination) to illustrate the
"legitimate business reason" framework: "[tihe burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every




paradigm is needed so that the legal community can begin the
arduous task of integrating transgender cases into the larger body
of sex discrimination law and policy. There are two areas of
discrimination law and policy in desperate need of guidance: the
Title VII sexual orientation cases and the political debate
surrounding ENDA.'9
Hostility toward gay and lesbian plaintiffs continues to be a
pervasive problem in American courts. Only the Ninth Circuit has
found that sexual orientation discrimination implicates Title VII, 200
while the remaining circuits, even those that have supported
transgender plaintiffs, 201' have refused to acknowledge such an
expansion.20 Recognizing that the courts have come to a
consensus in favor of a trans-inclusive Title VII would provide
helpful insights into these cases. Many of the sexual orientation
cases rely on the severely discredited Ulane I.203 Retiring Ulane II
would have an immediate impact on these cases, allowing for a
reexamination of the relationship between sex and sexual
orientation just as the transgender consensus has broken down
the legal conflation of sex and gender.204 Recognizing that sex does
not automatically coincide with a specific gender or sexual
orientation is an essential part of battling the broad spectrum of
sex discrimination and sex stereotyping that pervades our society
and distorts the law.200
199. For a discussion of the political debate, see supra note 7.
200. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
201. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764-65 (6th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging Smith and Barnes, but concluding that those cases' logic does not
apply to gay and lesbian plaintiffs).
202. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2012);
Wasek v. Arrow Energy Serv., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467-68 (6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v.
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009); Medina v. Income Support Div.,
N.M., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.
2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000); Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
203. See, e.g., Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084; see also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Congress has repeatedly rejected
legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.").
204. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law
and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995) (explaining that "there is no such thing as
discrimination 'based' solely or exclusively on sexual orientation" and that
"discrimination deemed based on sexual orientation also and necessarily is based
on sex or on gender (or on both).").
205. Some commentators argue that sexual orientation is a sex stereotype; i.e.,
that the expectation that men have intimate relations with women and vice versa
202 [Vol. 32:169
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On the policy front, many commentators suggest that the
solution to sexual orientation-based workplace discrimination lies
in the passage of the ENDA.206 Unfortunately, ENDA suffered an
enormous setback in 2007 from which it has yet to fully recover.207
In 2007, it seemed that ENDA had a chance of passing for the first
time; however, opponents objected to the inclusion of gender
identity.208 With passage in jeopardy, LGBT leaders in the House,
with the support of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), decided
to support a "compromise" bill that would only include protection
for sexual orientation as a first, albeit imperfect, step toward equal
employment opportunity for LGBT individuals;" however, the
transgender community did not see it this way, and the
"compromise" encountered enormous resistance.2 0  The non
inclusive ENDA passed the House, but eventually died in the
Senate.2 1' Democratic leaders and the HRC quickly went into
damage-control mode and modified their position promising to
is itself socially constructed. For a full explanation of that social construct, see
generally Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 465 (2004); Olivia Szwalbnest, Discriminating Because of "Pizzazz:" Why
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation Evidences Sexual Discrimination
Under the Sex-Stereotyping Doctrine of Title VII, 20 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Dunson, supra note 160, at 501; Ems, supra note 4, at 1360; Tan,
supra note 160, at 581.
207. ENDA has cycled through many incarnations over the years, and some
version of the Act (either as amendment to Title VII or as a stand-alone law) has
been put forth regularly since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the most recent
submissions, see S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1397,
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009);
S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007) (causing controversy for
excluding protection for "gender identity"); H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007)
(including, for the first time, protection for "gender identity").
208. Gabrielle Russon, Gay-Rights Milestone Draws Transgender Activists'
Outcry, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2007, at C8.
209. Id. at C8 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank, "[y]ou protect people when you
can.. . The notion you don't do anything until you do everything is self-
defeating."). But see Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: the Use and
Misuse of History in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397 (2009) (challenging the argument that LGBT
rights have been achieved by small steps).
210. See Murray, supra note 7, at A23 (reporting that over three hundred
organizations had signed a letter to Speaker Pelosi opposing the non-inclusive
version of ENDA).
211. See 153 CONG. REc. 30,353-92 (2007) (recording the House vote as 235 to
184, with fourteen abstaining).
Law and Inequality
never again support a non-inclusive ENDA.2 12 As a result of this
position, ENDA is not likely to become law in the near future.213
Transgender inclusion under Title VII offers progressive
lawmakers an alternate path. It is now clear that the federal
courts are willing to take transgender claims of employment
discrimination seriously under Title VII, making the need for
legislation to protect gender identity less immediate.214 On the
other hand, gay and lesbian individuals have been almost
uniformly denied protection under Title VII, making the need for
legislative action to protect them much more pressing. A two-
pronged campaign that emphasizes protection for gays and
lesbians through legislative action and protection for transgender
individuals through judicial action may permit a timely resolution
to these issues in a politically practical manner. In the end,
legislative action is desirable for both groups; however, to address
the immediate needs of these groups, a two-path solution may be
more practical.
Conclusion
These pressing issues illustrate that adopting a trans-
inclusive Title VII paradigm will help resolve many other legal
and policy concerns. This is not a premature step; if anything, it is
long overdue. It has been more than twenty years since Price
212. See HRC Board ENDA Policy, HuMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Sept. 1, 2011,
avaialable at http://web.archive.org/web/20110901015144/http://www.hrc.org/issues
/workplace/12346.htm ("We made a one time exception to our policy in 2007
because we strongly believed that supporting this vote would do more to advance
inclusive legislation. We will not support such a strategy again."); MOVING
AMERICA FORWARD: 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM,
http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform ("We support the
Employment Non- Discrimination Act because people should not be fired based on
their sexual orientation or gender identity.").
213. See William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VI: a Case for
Redefining "Because of Sex" to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 506-08 (2011) (suggesting that because
efforts to pass a standalone bill are unlikely to bear fruit and too prone to
destructive compromises, advocates should try to amend Title VII instead).
214. National LGBT groups have largely ignored or misrepresented these
developments, focusing instead on doomed efforts to pass national legislation.
Dana Beyer, Executive Director of Gender Rights Maryland, points out that this
strategy has left the trans community in "fear and paralysis" when they should be
actively enforcing their rights in court. See Dana Beyer, Burying the Lede: the
LGBT Community's Deafening Silence on Federal Transgender Employment
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Waterhouse changed the face of sex discrimination law, yet cases
such as Ulane II, which run directly counter to that decision,
continue to cause controversy. It is past the time to retire those
decisions. Sex discrimination law has developed to a point where
a new trans-inclusive paradigm can and must be adopted. Sex
discrimination continues to be a serious issue, and permitting
outdated decisions to distract from contemporary concerns will
only reinforce that discrimination. It is time for judges and
scholars to recognize and adopt a bold new trans-inclusive Title
VII paradigm, and to begin the task of integrating the transgender
cases into the larger sex discrimination jurisprudence.

